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1Introductory Notes: Dialogues on 
Globalization and Indigenous Cultures
Wang Fengzhen and Shaobo Xie
Globalization both as a concept and as an empirical process has caused 
seemingly endless debate. What is globalization? When did it begin? 
What is the impact of globalization on local economic, societal, and 
cultural structures and identities? None of these questions have or will 
have defi nite answers. There are four divergent views of globalization. 
With some critics globalization is a myth, an ideology, for nation-states 
and different nation-state situations still constitute the universal reality 
of the world. Some critics argue that globalization is nothing new, for as 
Rick Wolf contends in Europe and the People without History, the pro-
cess of globalization began with the beginning of the world. According 
to Wolf, the Neolithic Age already had global trade routes: Polynesian 
products traveled to Africa and Asian pottery pieces were scattered all 
over the world. Some scholars argue that globalization began with the 
emergence of colonial capitalism—or in the year of 1492. Still others 
take globalization as a fairly new historical phenomenon, whose inau-
guration is marked by the end of Cold War. The proponents of global-
ization celebrate it as an invigorating form of modernity that leads to 
universal prosperity, progress, and democracy as well as to new struc-
tures of feeling, imagination, and subjectivity. The opponents of glo-
balization believe that globalization, originated in and perpetuated by 
the centers of capitalist power, emerges as a rerun of Western imperial-
ism via TNCS, IMF, Hollywood fi lms, computer technology, American 
values and lifestyles, all of which work together to resubjugate the previ-
ous third and second worlds to the fi rst world’s domination. Those who 
embrace a Hegelian dialectical view of globalization processes speak of 
them as historically inevitable while at the same time launching rigorous 
critiques of their negative effects on social life.
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Of all the debates on globalization, the most engaging and productive 
that is of interest to everyone inside or outside academia and with or 
without expert knowledge about economics, politics, and culture seems 
to concern the consequences of interaction between the local and the 
global, that is, the transformation of local or indigenous cultures under 
the impact of the global fl ows of capital, information, ideology, values, 
and technology. For culture, as Raymond Williams has taught us, is a 
whole way of life, and everyone adopts a certain way of life or wants to 
have a changed way of life. A general anxiety permeates these discussions: 
the fear that the ongoing processes of globalization are threatening to 
level or erase various historically formed local cultures. In this particular 
debate, each side seems to be resistant or opposed to the perceived pros-
pects of disappearing indigenous or local cultures. Some critics maintain 
that globalization essentially means the unifi cation or Americanization 
of the world culture; some insist that that globalization is not necessar-
ily the story of cultural homogenization or Americanization; instead it 
encourages and creates cultural diversity and protean difference. These 
two positions are met with a third position that attempts to reconcile 
the global and the local—it argues that globalization is a two-fold pro-
cess which brings the universalization of particularism and the particu-
larization of universalism at the same time. 
Since the 1950s, with the advent of informational revolution, the 
Western capitalist countries have undergone radical socio-economic 
transformation characterized by the global division of labor, the rapid 
development of a global credit economy, the transnational corporations’ 
control of capital, an increasingly fl exible manufacture system and labor 
process, post-Fordist or Toyotist informatized production, and stan-
dardized market and consumption. Meanwhile manufacture centers 
have moved from the advanced post-industrial countries to peripheral 
or semi-peripheral countries and areas. In the capitalist centers such as 
USA, there has occurred a completely different mode of production, 
which is more of a production of production, a higher level of produc-
tion, or what some Americans call meta-production. The market of such 
production no longer prioritizes concrete commodities, but specifi c ar-
rangements or confi gurations of images, spectacles, and services. A new 
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signifying system of value has superseded the old one, and capital is 
reforming special spaces of accumulation. As culture is the social space 
for organizing capital and disseminating the desire of production, capi-
tal necessarily penetrates and saturates the social space of cultural pro-
duction. That is to say, with the growth of transnational corporations, 
culture itself becomes trans-nationalized as well, hence a global culture. 
Transnational corporations bring different societies and cultures closer, 
catalyzing cultural interpenetration, interaction, and transformation 
through new telecommunication media. The agency of transnational 
corporations colludes with one another, forming a transnational capi-
talist class, who do not identify with any particular country, nor even 
with the fi rst or Western world. They identify with the global capitalist 
system. Through penetration of capital into the remotest areas, trans-
national capitalists spread a consumer ideology that interpellates and 
affects the constitution of individual subjectivity, transforming individ-
uals into consumerist subjects all over the world. As consumerist sub-
jects, individuals are willingly incorporated into transnational capitalist 
culture-ideology, to borrow a phrase from Leslie Sklair, subjected to the 
ideas and values of the global capitalist system and losing or abandoning 
their previous cultural identities. 
It is in view of this perceived global situation that critics like Fredric 
Jameson, Masao Miyoshi, and Samir Amin argue that US-centered 
global capitalism is colonizing both the unconscious and the previous 
third world, recreating the world after its own image, converting lands 
into territories of the global Empire, people into its appendages, and 
things into commodities. In the moment of global capitalism, Jameson 
argues, the distinction between economics and culture has disappeared, 
for “commodifi cation today is also an aestheticization” and, together 
with weapons and food, “the entertainment business itself [is] one of 
the greatest and most profi table exports of the United States” (Jameson 
53). As Jameson comments, “The standardization of world culture, with 
local popular or traditional forms driven out or dumped down to make 
way for American television, American music, food, clothes and fi lms, 
has been seen by many as the very heart of globalization” (Jameson 51). 
In his view, American postmodern culture, due to the constant expan-
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sion of American military and economic forces, is aggressively penetrat-
ing into every corner of the world. It is in this sense that Marxist critics 
see capitalist globalization as threatening to lead to cultural homogeniza-
tion—world cultures homogenized or unifi ed by the logic of commod-
ity and reifi cation. It needs to be pointed out that these critics’ views 
of globalization as Americanization are radically different from Francis 
Fukuyama’s Americanist globalism, which is advocated and celebrated 
in his The End of History and the Last Man. Fukuyama maintains that 
history has run its full course of evolution in the day of global capital-
ism because the American model of democracy is now being embraced 
as the norm of socio-political life throughout the world. The universal 
triumph of democracy leads to the universal institution of democratic 
societies characterized by the satisfaction of individuals’ desires for rec-
ognition as equal. As an apologist of capitalist democracy and an advo-
cate of Americanism, Fukuyama’s ultimate purpose in declaring capital-
ist globalization as the end of history is to subsume all different nations 
and societies into one singular orbit of development. His globalism not 
only celebrates Americanism, but also presupposes a unifi ed world cul-
ture and a unifi ed collective subjectivity at what he calls the end of his-
tory. In critiquing global capitalism, Marxist critics like Amin, Jameson, 
and Miyoshi also take globalization for Americanization; however, they 
see it as vicious, bloody American expansionism. In describing global-
ization as standardization or Americanization in manufacture, market, 
and consumption, they, unlike Fukuyama, do not celebrate or propa-
gate the idea of Americanization. Rather, what they do is to map out 
an objectively happening reality, and their ultimate purpose is to expose 
the vices of global capitalism, calling upon the violently and unequally 
globalized to imagine utopian alternatives to the existing social order de-
fi ned by social disintegration, atomization, and commodifi cation. 
The view of global capitalism as leading to capitalist globality is 
counterpointed by critics like Samuel Huntington, Arjun Appadurai, 
and John Gray, in whose estimate, what reigns in the world is still ir-
resolvable or irreconcilable difference. In his The Clash of Civilizations, 
Huntington argues that the most signifi cant confl icts among nation-
states are cultural or civilizational instead of ideological, political, or 
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economic. “In the post-Cold War world,” he contends, “states increas-
ingly defi ne their interests in civilizational terms” (34) and “local politics 
is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilization” 
(28). Modernization is different from Westernization, for it has created 
neither any signifi cant universal civilization nor the Westernization of 
non-Western societies. Civilizational confrontation is on the rise and the 
infl uence of the West is on the decline. While non-Western civilizations 
are redefi ning and reaffi rming their own cultural values, Western societ-
ies’ universalism only manages to return the world to civilizational con-
frontation. In Modernity at Large, Appadurai argues that electronic media 
and migration have caused an epochal rupture between the modern and 
the postmodern. Electronic media and migration have brought about 
transnational and translocal solidarities of taste, opinion, and pleasure, 
radically undermining nation-states’ control over individuals and com-
munities within and without geopolitical borders. Globalization is in no 
way a story of homogenization; modernity at large is modernity decen-
tered, differentiated, and resistant to defi nitive boundaries. Part of the 
implications of Appadurai’s notion of modernity at large seems to be 
that postmodern global fl ows of biopower, information, fi nance, tech-
nology, values, and narratives have triggered a stampede of uncontrol-
lable micro- and macro-modernities. Huntington’s and Appadurai’s no-
tions of modernity seem to echo, in their respective ways, Gray’s view of 
global capitalism, which, he maintains, does not inaugurate a universal 
civilization; instead, it allows indigenous forms of capitalism to emerge 
and develop, “diverging from the ideal free market and from each other. 
It creates regimes that achieve modernity by renewing their own cultural 
traditions, not by imitating Western countries. There are many moder-
nities and as many ways of failing to be modern” (Gray 195).
Challenging the above views is Roland Robertson’s position on glo-
balization which he characterizes as the universalization of particularism 
and the particularization of universalism. This two-fold process happens 
simultaneously throughout the history of international or global con-
tact. His classic example is Japan, on which such turn-of-the-century 
Western sociologists as Durkheim, Spencer, and Max Weber had great 
impact. It was under Spencer’s explicit advice that “the Meiji political 
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elite established a fi rm tradition-based Japanese identity” (Robertson 
109). Japan is the exemplary non-Western country that electively in-
corporates and syncretizes ideas “from other cultures in such a way as to 
particularize the universal” and “return[s] the product of that process to 
the world as a uniquely Japanese contribution to the universal” (102). 
Robertson argues that Western sociology and classical sociologists since 
Durkheim and Weber have regrettably ignored two things: the world is 
as interpenetrated and interconnected and nationally constituted societ-
ies as inherently heterogeneous. While they were busy discussing con-
trasts between Western countries and non-Western countries, they were 
not aware of non-Western countries being “busy sifting and implement-
ing packages of Western ideas for very concrete political, economic and 
cultural reasons” (110). Robertson challenges sociology’s dominant ten-
dency to conceive or regard nationally constituted societies as homoge-
neous or unitary entities. The implications of Robertson’s argument are 
not only that nationally constituted societies are always spaces of co-ex-
istence of different ethnic communities, but also that there is always for-
eignness or otherness in self-identity (echoing Julia Kristeva’s notion of 
“the foreigner in the self ”). This latter implication supports his notion 
of particular in universal and universal in particular or the universaliza-
tion of the particular and the particularization of the universalism. For 
“the cultures of particular societies are, to different degrees, the result 
of their interactions with other societies in the global system. In other 
words, national-societal cultures have been differentially formed in in-
terpenetration with signifi cant others” (113). The two arguments (on 
heterogeneous national-societal cultures and on interpenetration be-
tween countries) support and reinforce each other—they are actually 
two moments or sides of one argument—one leading to the other.
It is in the context of this general debate on globalization and culture 
that we proposed this special issue on “Globalization and Indigenous 
Cultures.” Aware that the issues debated have engaged world-wide schol-
arly attention for the past two decades and will remain long open to fur-
ther dialogue in the future, we intend to provide space for discussion 
among a group of scholars on the relationship of economic and techno-
logical globalization and cultural-ideological transformations across the 
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world, or, put somewhat differently, on the interaction between West-
centered global fl ows of capital, biopower, technology, values, lifestyles, 
and local or indigenous cultural habits and conventions in peripheral 
or semi-peripheral countries or areas. As vocabulary is a major part of 
the common ground for any discourse, it is necessary to clarify the am-
biguity of “indigenous,” as well as the relationship among the follow-
ing cognate words themselves: “indigenous,” “indigenes,” “indigeniza-
tion,” and “indigenism.” By “indigenous,” we mean “native” or “having 
originated in and being produced, growing, living, or occurring natu-
rally in a particular region or environment”(Merriam Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 592). Actually it could be taken as equivalent to what is des-
ignated by the Chinese word “bentu.” When we say “indigenous cul-
tures,” we mean bentu wenhua of historically colonized or semi-colo-
nized countries or of erstwhile “third world” countries as distinguished 
from postmodern Western cultures. More specifi cally, the term both 
refers to cultural values, productions, traditions, and heritages in those 
countries which stand distinct from postmodern Western cultures and 
refers to cultural traditions and heritages of those countries which have 
more or less remained little affected by Western cultures.
The tension among “indigenous,” “indigenes,” “indigenization,” 
and “indigenism” reminds us of the relationship between “culture” and 
“cultural” as has been discussed respectively by Raymond Williams 
and Arjun Appadurai. While the adjective “indigenous,” for example, 
can apply to different situations unproblematically, it does not seem 
to sound right to use the noun “indigenes” for the Chinese in China 
(Hans and even ethnic populations such as Miaos, Yaos, Bais or Urgur 
people in China) or for Indians in India though it is perfect when used 
to name First Nations peoples in Canada, Maoris in New Zealand, and 
Gaoshan people in Taiwan. Similarly, “indigenization” can apply to pre-
viously colonized and semi-colonized populations but not to aborigi-
nal populations in North America and Taiwan. Because to indigenize 
is to make a native version of something coming from abroad, and that 
always involves, as history testifi es, a voluntary or imposed systematic 
project of modernity or modernization with the colonized (India and 
China for example) after colonial encounter. The end result is a kind of 
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hybridization in which neither the Western nor the indigenous remain 
unchanged. However, with the aboriginal peoples across the world, the 
kind of indigenization described above as an act or an event did not 
really happen, for what they met was threat or reality of extinction; 
they became either borderless or confi ned to specifi c spaces of reser-
vation. Today, the 300,000 indigenes (For this fi gure see Arif Dirlik’s 
article included in this issue) around the world are much less in a posi-
tion to indigenize, not because they do not want to, but because they 
do not have an undeprived or undestroyed culture that can generate as 
much enabling space for negotiation, translation, appropriation, and 
resistance required by indigenization as do colonized nations with bor-
ders. More importantly, to indigenize, as previously noted, always in-
volves a notion of modernity. The argument can be extended to the case 
of diasporic Chinese populations indigenized in lands they migrated 
to. If “indigenization” in China and India means making a Chinese or 
Indian version of Western thoughts and institutions, modernity (not 
necessarily Western type of modernity though) seems to be the point of 
departure and destination. The indigenization of diasporic Chinese or 
Indian populations overseas, such as in the Caribbean, Africa, or other 
parts of Asia, however, is an entirely different story: There is more as-
similation and much less negotiation in their indigenization and, there-
fore, it is not informed or enabled by a notion of or a desire for moder-
nity. Moreover, the difference between “local” and “indigenous” and 
between “to localize” and “to indigenize” also calls for discrimination. 
We can say local traditions or industries in provinces or areas in China 
but not indigenous; there is no problem involved if we say localized 
mandarin or Peking opera in Hunan or Hubei. However, in a global 
setting, indigenization and localization as well as indigenous and local 
seem almost entirely interchangeable: the indigenization or localization 
of global forces or Western “democracy” in any third world country may 
mean the same thing, though the former seems to have a stronger sense 
of bentuhua (indigenization) which implies appropriation and resistance 
going hand in hand, hence more politico-culturally consequent.
Given the inclusive defi nition of the term “indigenous,” it is argu-
able that there are different kinds of indigeneity and indigenous poli-
*ARIEL 34-1~1-150.indd   8 4/21/05   11:01:57 AM
9In t roduc to r y  No t e s
tics, whose politico-ideological resonance deserves dialectical analysis. 
In his article “Globalization, Indigenism, and the Politics of Place,” Arif 
Dirlik examines two indigenous situations, one of which refers to third 
world countries resisting globalization from the West, upholding their 
own cultural, ethical, and political institutions and traditions; the other 
refers to aboriginal peoples struggling to preserve their indigenous cul-
tures, traditions, and social institutions in the fi rst, second, and third 
worlds. While acknowledging the validity of the term “indigenous” and 
the epistemological and political signifi cance of indigenous discourse in 
each situation, Dirlik at the same time argues that indigeneity in the age 
of globalization or after global colonial or neocolonial conquest is more 
of an imagined reality, a desire, a politically consequent projected goal 
for identity politics, than a really existing cultural, social, and economic 
mode of production. The indigenization of modernity in the nation 
challenges the paradigmatic claims of the Western version of moder-
nity, providing “alternatives to parochial Euro/American traditions,” for 
these traditions “masquerade as exclusive forces of universal truth.” But 
the national project is itself a colonial or colonizing force. Indigenous 
projects must be critical of both global colonialism from without and 
national colonialism from within the nation-state. Indigenism is a much 
needed utopia, but it could also serve as a source of conservatism rather 
than a radical challenge to the status quo. J. Hillis Miller’s article en-
titled “The Indigene and the Cybersurfer” stages two arguments. One 
argument questions the binary opposition between the indigene and 
the cybersurfer, another name for the cosmopolitan; the other rehearses 
and recontextualizes Jean-Luc Nancy’s argument that every community, 
past and present, is composed of dissimilar individuals whose absolute 
singularity is uncomprehendable and untouchable. Following Wallace 
Stevens’s idea of the indigenous, Miller evokes the indigenes as living 
perfectly at one with their environments and with other indigenes, un-
derstanding one another perfectly well due to the transparency of their 
shared language before he proceeds to deconstruct the indigenes thus 
conceived as mythical realities. In redeploying Nancy’s notion of com-
munity in the context of discussions about global/local interaction, 
Miller contends that the singularity of neither indigene nor cybersurfer 
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is touched by indigenous culture or by the leveling American popular 
culture. “Beneath the superfi cial cultural garments [of globalization,]” he 
contends, “both indigene and cybersurfer remain singular, wholly other 
to one another.” Both arguments, though apparently contradicting each 
other, seem to argue that there is no real danger of global Western capi-
talist culture erasing cultural and ethnic differences across the world, 
because the world is already Westernized and because individuals and 
communities are essentially impenetrable and uncolonizable.
Rob Wilson investigates global semiotic displacement, the Disney-
fi cation of indigenous cultures, and the transnational migration of 
images, ideas, and narratives from one geopolitical space to another. 
Global reproductions of indigenous cultures, music, and landscape, 
Wilson argues, increasingly send the local culture offshore and world-
wide, “resolving the tensions of imperial history and global imbalance 
into mongrel fantasy, soft spectacle, and present-serving myth.” In call-
ing upon transnational cultural studies to contest its fi eld imaginary, 
he recommends two analytical frameworks of displacement respectively 
offered by Yunte Huang and Houston Wood. Huang’s framework ad-
dresses the transpacifi c displacement in the domain of cultural images 
and meanings, calling for a revised conception of American literature. 
Wood’s new perspective of American Pacifi c studies focuses on the rhe-
torical displacement of native Hawaiians in dominant U.S. While agree-
ing with Huang that the U.S./Pacifi c Asia relationship should be seen as 
a two-way traffi c instead of a one-way route of Americanization, Wilson 
regards Wood’s model of U.S./Pacifi c studies as a necessary complement 
to Huang’s, for Wood’s model examines the U.S. relationship with its in-
terior Pacifi c as one of domination and colonization cum Disneyfi cation 
via “rhetoric of demonization.” On the one hand, Wilson maintains that 
the semiotic displacement, the displacement in the domain of cultural 
images and meanings, has to be conceived of as a two-way traffi c, that 
is, it refers to the transpacifi c migration of texts, images, ideas, and cul-
tural meanings and values from both sides of the Pacifi c. On the other, 
through his discussion of the US postmodernist colonization of its inte-
rior Pacifi c, he alerts his readers to the fact that the transpacifi c or global 
fl ows of ideas, images, and values are happening in an asymmetrical fash-
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ion. As a half-way fellow traveller with Wilson, Bruce Robbins presents his 
perspective on globalization and the relationship between the global and 
the local through a close reading of passages from Richard Power’s 1998 
novel Gain and through a discussion of Walt Whitman’s cosmopolitan-
ism. After critically analyzing Whitman’s cosmopolitanism with its dem-
ocratic inclusiveness as reminiscent of George Bush’s imperialist rhetoric 
heard worldwide in the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq, Robbins pro-
ceeds to argue that, despite its dangerous impulse, Whitman’s poetics of 
cosmopolitanism is a very important line of defense against the unilat-
eralism of the American government. In Robbins’s view, the world today 
is interdependent, for different countries, areas, and peoples are visible 
and invisible components of “a great global dance.” It is impossible to 
draw a clear line of demarcation between home and cosmos, the global 
and the local, and the West and the indigenous. He concludes by call-
ing upon us to challenge our received conception of us and the world, 
stretching ourselves to “become conscious of our interdependence with 
the rest of the world,” to adapt to the ways in which we are already 
“connected to the rest of the world,” and to see the world in our homes, 
and “our homes . . . in the world.” Robbins’s intervention on the glo-
balization debate seems to give credit to each of the three previously 
discussed positions—globalization as Americanization, globalization as 
endless differentiation, and globalization as an integration of universal-
ism and particularism. For one of the key themes of Power’s novel Gain 
is that today it takes a fully interconnected world to manufacture any 
single product and that global capitalism has eaten into everyone’s body 
and daily routine life. If the world is already economically and cultur-
ally globalized as Robbins argues, then the contemporary world unde-
niably imploded with irreconcilable ethnic, civilizational, and politico-
religious differences and confl icts seems to point to the simultaneity of 
globalization and differentiation.
Third-world situations of globalization and third world reactions to 
globalization are always at the core of a debate about globalization. The 
two Chinese scholars, in their respective contributions, present a third-
world case of globalization and a third-world response to global capi-
talism. Due to burgeoning capitalism and the infl ux of transnational 
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capital into China over the past two decades, Wang Liya argues, China 
is undergoing vast changes economically, technologically, culturally, and 
ideologically. The Chinese are beginning to buy into consumerism with 
a vengeance. The power of capital transforms everything it touches into 
a commodity. Education, media, art, and everyday life, all these are be-
coming increasingly commercialized while the disciplinary studies in the 
Humanities are being reduced to marginal status. Education in China 
has become a profi t-oriented industry in itself. In Wang’s view, econom-
ic transformation triggers or happens at the same time with cultural 
transformation. She argues that there is no distinct division between the 
two. Any dogmatic adherence to a rigid separation of the economic and 
the cultural will only impede an enlightened project of emancipation. 
The implications of her assertions are that economic globalization will 
necessarily result in cultural-ideological globalization, a position cham-
pioned by critics like Fredric Jameson and John Sklair. Chen Yongguo 
offers a double critique—the Chinese New Left critics’ critique of glo-
balization and his own critique of their critique. The Chinese New Left’s 
resistance to globalization is premised on its argument that the processes 
of global capitalism totally destroy indigenous industries, leaving them 
disordered and unreconstructed, further marginalizing the undeveloped 
or underdeveloped countries and undermining severely the sovereignty 
of the nation-state. According to the Chinese New Left, economic glo-
balization is a process of subjugating different regions, societies, and in-
dividuals to a hierarchical and unequal structure of global monopoliza-
tion. The alternative is nationalism. Chen argues that, in drawing their 
intellectual inspiration from the Western Left intellectuals, the Chinese 
New Left seems to have ignored the post-war historical context in which 
the Frankfurt School mounted attacks on capitalist modernity and en-
lightenment. China needs to merge into the new world system, he in-
sists, for globalization enables China to acquire needed technological 
means and economic power to eventually counterbalance the hegemon-
ic system of global capitalism. Chen speaks positively of the changes that 
have happened in China over the past two decades, which are paving the 
way for a successful transition from a developing country to a developed 
one. What the readers hear or overhear between the lines is “What’s 
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Wrong with globalization?” These two articles can be taken as dialogue 
between indigenous globalization scholars and their Western colleagues 
as well as between Chinese globalization scholars themselves. We offer 
these articles, not as defi nitive statements, but rather as interventions—
across continents and oceans—that will hopefully facilitate and develop 
discussions on this urgent topic.
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